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ABSTRACT
According to a promising proposal, cognitive abilities and
processes in the context of social institutions should be char-
acterized as socially extended cognition. However, this idea
invokes resistance because it seems to invoke metaphysical
problems such as a serious variant of the problem of cognitive
bloat. In this paper, I argue that defenders of socially extended
cognition are not overly worried by such problems because
their position is akin to a position known as ‘distributed cogni-
tion,’ which avoids these problems. Nevertheless, I will argue
that the explanatory aims of socially extended cognition do
not correspond to the distributed cognition perspective. The
ensuing predicament can be avoided, however, by recogniz-
ing that the idea of socially extended cognition hinges on the
conﬂation of two dimensions of the interconnection of the
elements in a cognitive system, which I will label ‘functional
integration’ and ‘task-dependency.’ Separating these dimen-
sions allows us to identify an overlooked alternative for
extended and distributed cognition – symbiotic cognition –
that ﬁts cognition in social institutions better than both and
avoids the predicament.
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1. Introduction
Social institutions greatly enhance the cognitive reach and repertoire of
humans. Legal systems, monetary systems, educational systems, and systems
of cultural conventions, for example, allow us to perform cognitive operations
that are impossible and often inconceivable in their absence. How should we
characterize cognitive processes that take place in the context of social institu-
tions? According to a relatively recent proposal, this question can be
answered, at least in part, by using the extended cognition framework. Some
theorists argue that our cognitive processes are not just extended by artifacts,
as is claimed in the original extendedmind proposal (Clark &Chalmers, 1998;
Menary, 2010), but also by social institutions (De Jaegher, Di Paolo, &
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Gallagher, 2010; Fuchs & De Jaegher, 2009; Gallagher, 2013; Gallagher &
Crisaﬁ, 2009).
Although I am very sympathetic to the idea of extended cognition, I will
argue that the extended cognition framework is not appropriate to character-
ize the way in which social institutions enable, enhance, and co-constitute
cognitive processes. Extended cognition ultimately hinges on the idea that
items external to the brain and body are functionally integrated in the overall
cognitive system. Functional integration is a causal notion. While social
institutions shape our cognition in part through functional integration, the
more signiﬁcant way in which they determine and constitute our cognition is
through what I will label task-dependency; roughly, the holistic inter-deﬁning
of tasks and roles. Task-dependency is not a causal notion, but a notion that
pertains to organization and coordination. In this paper, I will argue that the
idea that social institutions extend our cognition mistakenly conﬂates func-
tional integration and task-dependency. I will propose that social institutions
constitute cognitive capacities more principally through task-dependency,
and I will label this type of cognition symbiotic cognition.
In order to develop this argument, I will concentrate on Shaun
Gallagher’s views on socially extended cognition,1 which I will introduce in
Section 2. In Section 3, I will brieﬂy discuss what may seem to be two serious
objections to this idea: the problem of cognitive bloat and the inability to
delineate cognitive systems. In Section 4, I will argue that Gallagher is not
overly alarmed by these problems, probably because his notion of socially
extended cognition overlaps with what Hutchins has labeled distributed
cognition. I will explain distributed cognition and argue that it does not
fall prey to problems of cognitive bloat or delineation. In Section 5, however,
I will argue that on closer inspection, Gallagher’s socially extended cogni-
tion cannot count as a form of distributed cognition. Rather than taking
a distributed perspective – in other words, asking which individuals con-
tribute to social institutions conceived as cognitive systems – it takes
a centered perspective – asking which social institutions contribute to the
cognitive processes of individuals. The resulting predicament can be
avoided if we can identify a position that is suﬃciently similar to distributed
cognition to avoid the metaphysical problems of Section 3 and suﬃciently
diﬀerent from it to allow for a centered perspective.
Identifying such a position is the aim of Section 6. I will introduce the
distinction between functional integration and task-dependency and use it
to devise a simple taxonomy of four varieties of scaﬀolded cognition. One of
these is an overlooked possibility of symbiotic cognition, characterized
mainly by task-dependency. Symbiotic cognition ﬁts the required proﬁle.
It would be a good replacement for socially extended cognition, provided
that it explain what socially extended cognition does: (1) how social institu-
tions co-constitute cognitive processes and (2) how this involves
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a substantial degree of cognitive oﬄoading. In Section 7, I will argue that
symbiotic cognition explains both.
2. Socially extended cognition
The idea that cognitive processes can be extended by items outside our
brains and bodies with which we are causally “coupled” has been defended
by many for more than two decades (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2008;
Menary, 2010). The original proposal of such active externalism (Hurley,
2010) hinged on the parity principle, according to which processes outside
our brains that are functionally similar or equivalent to brain processes
contributing to cognition can contribute to – and be constitutive of – our
cognition as well. A second wave of extended mind theorists replaced the
parity principle with what is known as the complementarity principle: Items
external to our brains and bodies can contribute to cognition, not because
they structurally resemble processes that also occur inside the brain, but
because they complement brain processes and, by doing so, allow for new
cognitive capacities (Sutton, 2010).
The complementarity principle allows for a much wider variety of ways to
extend cognition than the parity principle.2 This leeway is what Shaun
Gallagher makes use of when introducing and defending the idea of ‘socially
extended cognition’ (Gallagher, 2013; Gallagher & Crisaﬁ, 2009). Gallagher
argues for the following:
. . . a liberal, and speciﬁcally social extension of the extended mind hypothesis [and]
appeal[s] to social practices and institutions that are what we might call ‘mental
institutions’ (Gallagher & Crisaﬁ, 2009), in the sense that they are not only
institutions with which we accomplish certain cognitive processes, but also are
such that without them such cognitive processes would no longer exist. (Gallagher,
2013, p. 6)
Examples include legal systems, educational systems, and museums. Our
legal system, for instance, enables an array of thoughts and actions that are
unintelligible without the concepts and procedural social routines asso-
ciated with the law. Consider the practice of formalizing an agreement
between two people by signing a contract. The thoughts and actions
involved are literally unthinkable without a legal background:
A contract or legal agreement . . . is in some real sense an expression of several
minds externalized and extended into the world, instantiating in external memory
an agreed-upon decision, adding to a system of rights and laws that transcend the
particularities of any individual’s mind. Contracts are institutions that embody
conceptual schemas that, in turn, contribute to and shape our cognitive processes.
(Gallagher, 2013, p. 6)
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Mental institutions need not only consist of formal organizations. Cultural
norms and practices may also count as such. Gallagher gives the following
example:
In solving a problem like keeping my cattle in my pasture, my bodily manipulations of
a set of wooden poles and wire are not necessarily part of the cognitive process; but
my engagement with the particular local custom/practice of solving this problem with
a fence (and even a speciﬁc kind of fence) is a cognitive part of the problem solving. In
such cases, cultural practices, local know-how in the form of established practices,
etc., in either formal or informal ways, enter into and shape the thinking process.
Without such cultural practices, rules, norms, etc. our thinking – our cognitive
processes – would be diﬀerent. (Gallagher, 2013, p. 10)
By explicitly linking this proposal to earlier extended mind hypotheses, the
suggestion is made that just like Otto’s notebook becomes a part of Otto’s
mind, social institutions literally become part of our minds: “Just as
a notebook or a hand-held piece of technology may be viewed as aﬀording
a way to enhance or extend our mental possibilities, so our encounters with
others, especially in the context of various institutional procedures and
social practices may oﬀer structures that support and extend our cognitive
abilities” (Gallagher, 2013, p. 4). Mental institutions such as legal systems
“extend our cognitive processes when we engage with them (that is, when
we interact with, or are enactively coupled to them in the right way)”
(Gallagher, 2013, p. 6). This makes them part of our cognitive processes:
“It is the fact that I am working and engaged in the right way with mental
institutions that makes them a constituent part of my cognitive processes”
(Gallagher, 2013, p. 9).
It should be noted that the idea that external items literally become part of
our minds gets a slightly diﬀerent interpretation in Gallagher’s work than in
the work of Clark and Chalmers. This is due to the fact that Clark and
Chalmers apply a generally functionalist outlook so that external items are
thought to be part of the “realization base” of functions that deﬁne cognitive
processes. Gallagher, by contrast, adopts an enactivist conception of cogni-
tion, according to which cognition is a speciﬁc type of engagement with the
world. On his view, to be part of a cognitive process is to be part of a process
in which an individual engages with the world. These diﬀerences should not
be exaggerated, however, when interpreting the claim that social institutions
are literally a part of our cognitive processes. Gallagher’s notion of ‘consti-
tution’ – employed in the idea that institutions are a “constitutive part” of
our cognitive processes – is derived fromDe Jaegher et al. On their notion of
‘constitution,’ “P is a constitutive element [of X] if P is part of the processes
that produce X” (De Jaegher et al., 2010, p. 443). ‘Producing,’ on their view,
means simultaneously co-occurring with and bringing about the produced
phenomenon (cognition, in our case): “The set of all the constitutive
elements is the phenomenon itself” (De Jaegher et al., 2010, p. 443). This
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suggests that if social institutions constitute cognitive processes, then they
are literally a part of these processes.
3. Two problems
Classic attacks on the extended mind hypothesis involve defenses of intern-
alist, cognitivist characterizations of cognition. They rely on the idea that the
real “mark of the mental” is the existence of non-derived mental content and
that causal coupling between brains and external items should not be
mistaken for co-constituting cognition (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, 2008,
2010). I will set these arguments aside. Not only are there strong counter
arguments (e.g., Clark, 2010; Menary, 2007) and not only is the idea of non-
derived content highly controversial (e.g., Dennett, 1987; Hutto & Myin,
2013, 2017), the point is more that these arguments are not speciﬁcally
aimed at socially extended cognition. Moreover, since I will eventually argue
(in Sections 5 and 6) that what Gallagher and others label ‘socially extended
cognition’ is not just an extension of the idea of extended cognition, these
criticisms will turn out to be irrelevant.
One serious line of criticism that is relevant is voiced by Richard Menary.
On his ‘cognitive integration’ view, “institutions . . . are usually enabling or
background conditions for cognitive processing” (Menary, 2013, p. 27; see
also Huebner, 2013). Menary draws the line: The complementarity principle
allows us to invoke a wide variety of ways to think of the mind as being
extended, but we need to stop somewhere. This worry is akin to what Robert
Rupert (2004) calls ‘cognitive bloat’. Menary (2013, p. 32) mentions the
example of BBC news. Does the fact that he uses BBC news as his main
source of information about the situation in Syria imply that BBC news is
part of his mind? According to many that would be absurd; it is much more
intuitive to think of it as part of the background against which his mind is
able to function as it does.
To be sure, this problem is intuitive and does not constitute a logical
objection to the idea of socially extended cognition. It becomes more salient
when we speak of a socially extended ‘mind’ rather than ‘cognition’ and
when we think of cognitive extensions as ‘parts of minds.’ The idea that BBC
is a proper part of mymind – the locus of control of my body, and the seat of
my thoughts, memories, personality, and identity – sounds more counter-
intuitive than the idea that BBC extends my cognitive processes. Thus, much
depends on being precise about characterizing the relation between persons
and social institutions and on the question of whether ‘extension’ is the best
metaphor to characterize this relation.
Gallagher recognizes the threat of cognitive bloat but defends extension
terminology. He urges us not to exaggerate the extent to which institutions
really are a part of our minds: “Only so far as I am properly engaged with
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these institutions (or with notebooks or pieces of technology) do they
contribute to the constitution of my cognitive processes. If I am not engaged
with them (just as some neuronal processes in my brain may remain
unactivated in speciﬁc circumstances), then they are not cognitively acti-
vated” (Gallagher, 2013, p. 9–10). Structural coupling is here replaced with
dynamical coupling and uncoupling. However, is this the right move to allay
the intuitive worry? Even if we do not count the decoupled parts of social
institutions, when a judge is coupled with the legal system – say, when she is
gathering information from barristers and colleagues and consulting docu-
ments on cases similar to the one she will have to rule on – are her thought
processes going on in parts of the legal system?
Apart from the width of extension, there are further worries. For one thing,
where do we draw the boundary of the relevant part of the legal system (see.,
Ludwig, 2015)? The opinions of colleagues and barristers depend on informa-
tion provided by still others, on documents that they have read and testimo-
nies they have heard. What, exactly, is the judge supposed to be coupled with?
What causal interactions would this coupling consist of? Surely, such ques-
tions are diﬃcult to answer, even if we do not ask for a high degree of
precision. There is currently an interesting debate on how to draw the
boundaries of cognitive systems viewed from the extended mind perspective
(Van Eck & Looren de Jong, 2016). The most prominent proposal that is on
the table is a mechanistic criterion based on Craver’s idea that parts of
mechanisms and mechanistic wholes should be mutually manipulable
(Craver, 2007; Kaplan, 2012; Krickel, 2018). But whether such a criterion
can be used to demarcate systems as wide as they are now proposed to be by
the socially extended mind hypothesis is an open question at best; the systems
discussed in the debate on the boundaries of extended systems are consider-
ably less wide. Moreover, the mechanistic view it is based on is generally not
welcomed by those who defend the enactivist view on cognition that underlies
the idea of socially extended cognition (Kirchoﬀ, 2017).
Thus, to sum up, there seem to be at least two intuitive worries associated
with socially extended cognition: (1) cognitive bloat and (2) the lack of
a clear demarcation of the boundaries of the socially extended mind. I will
not discuss the question of whether these objections are lethal to Gallagher’s
proposal. The point of bringing them up at this stage is to interpret the
notion of ‘socially extended cognition’ further.
4. Distributed cognition
Gallagher is not overly alarmed by these problems. One plausible reason for
this is that many descriptions he gives of socially extended cognition portray
it as being very similar to what is known as ‘distributed cognition.’ I will
discuss these descriptions in the next section. In this section, I will introduce
6 M. SLORS
distributed cognition and argue that it is not susceptible to the problems
mentioned in the previous section.
Distributed cognition involves (but is not limited to) the idea that cog-
nitive processes can be dispersed over a group of individuals. It is also
known as ‘collective cognition’ or ‘macrocognition’ (Huebner, 2014). This
type of cognition was highlighted most prominently by Edwin Hutchins
(Hutchins, 1995), though Michaelian and Sutton (2013) trace the idea back
to Vygotsky, among others, and Cole and Engeström (1993) argue that it has
been part and parcel of psychology from Wundt onwards. Hutchins’ main
example is that of a team of people navigating a marine vessel. This naviga-
tion can best be understood as one cognitive task, even though a number of
individuals contribute to it in narrowly speciﬁed ways. Other defenders of
the idea have claimed that collective memory is a good example (Donald,
1991; Michaelian & Sutton, 2013; Sutton, 2010). It has been proposed, for
example, that married couples are able to remember events together that
they cannot remember equally well individually (Theiner, 2013; Wegner,
1986; Wegner, Raymond, & Erber, 1991). Further examples of distributed
cognition involve various lab experiments in which people can only solve
problems together (Theiner, Allen, & Goldstone, 2010).
Distributed cognition is often compared to and connected or even inte-
grated with extended cognition (Clark, 1996). However, there is an impor-
tant diﬀerence. The central contrast in the debate on extended cognition is
that of internalism versus (active) externalism: Should we or should we not
view external items that our brains are coupled with as part of our cognitive
processes? The central contrast in the distributed cognition literature is
a centered perspective on the cognition of individuals (or individual ele-
ments of a system) versus a distributed perspective on the interconnection
of collaborating individuals (or interconnected elements of a system). In
Hutchins’ words, “distributed cognition is not a kind of cognition; it is
a perspective on all of cognition” (Hutchins, 2014, p. 36).3 From this
perspective, cognition emerges from the interaction between distributed
processes, with no process or set of processes that is the center or hub of
the overall cognitive process. In principle, such a perspective can be adopted
on all scales. To illustrate this point, Hutchins mentions computer models of
language acquisition in groups of people and compares them to the problem
of how visual modules in the brain learn to communicate the information
needed to recover depth from stereo vision without having a teacher: “It
turns out that the problem of how a community can learn a lexicon without
a teacher to specify the elements of a lexicon is very similar to the problem of
how various brain areas might learn to communicate without a teacher to
specify the form of information to exchange” (Hutchins, 2014, p. 38).
Even though the idea of distributed cognition can be applied on all scales,
it is best known for its application at the scale of groups of people – such as
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in the marine vessel example or the example of pilots collaborating in an
airplane cockpit – for these types of examples stretch the meaning of
‘cognition’ beyond the traditional boundaries of the skull. In this respect,
distributed cognition is like extended cognition. However, in contrast to
Clark and Chalmers’ original extended mind hypothesis, the idea here is not
that the items external to the brain and body of a person literally become
part of that person’s mind. The idea, rather, is precisely to forgo such
centering on one brain, one mind, or one person. This point is crucial in
connection with the two problems of the previous section, as those problems
arise from a perspective that centers on a single situated person.
If Gallagher’s socially extended cognition can be reinterpreted as a form
of distributed cognition, it would be relatively immune to the objections
leveled against socially extended cognition. For one thing, the problem of
cognitive bloat would disappear. Nothing in the idea that social institutions
are distributed cognitive systems suggests that social institutions are a part
of individual minds. The idea is not that individual minds or brains are
coupled with (large parts of) institutions in exactly the same way that Otto is
coupled with his notebook. To play your part as a teacher in an educational
system or as a judge in a legal system is a much more complex and versatile
relationship – if only because a social institution is quite a diﬀerent item
from a notebook. This does not mean that a judge’s cognition is less tightly
connected with a legal system than Otto is with his notebook. In fact, it
might, arguably, be the other way around: The cognitive tasks of a judge are
not just aided, enhanced, or made possible by the system she is a part of – as
Otto’s memory is by his notebook – they are created by the system (more on
this in Sections 5–7). The point, however, is that to claim this is not
necessarily to claim that the system, or a large part thereof, is part of the
judge’s mind. Just like Richard Menary’s mind is not co-constituted by BBC
and a teacher’s mind is not extended by her calculator and a large chunk of
the educational system.
The problem of vague boundaries might be a bit less easy to get rid of, for
there are, in all likelihood, diﬀerent ways of drawing the boundaries of
systems that are widely distributed, like legal systems and educational
systems. However, drawing the boundaries of a distributed system is not
the same problem as deciding what to include in a Clark-and-Chalmers-
style extended cognitive system. The latter problem requires a principled
stance on when external items can be considered to be literally part of an
individual’s mind. However, in order to determine the boundaries of
a socially distributed system such as a legal system or an educational system,
we do not need such principled metaphysical choices. Hence, even though
the problem of vague boundaries is not solved, the sting is taken out of the
problem is not acute cognition proposal as a form of distributed cognition.
The question, however, is whether such an interpretation is feasible.
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5. A predicament
The main reason for thinking that Gallagher’s notion of socially extended
cognition is similar to Hutchins’ notion of distributed cognition is that
Gallagher stresses the extent to which cognitive processes that are consti-
tuted by social institutions are intelligible only within the context of such
institutions. They exist only because they are part of the functioning of
larger systems of interacting individuals. The quote on contracts in Section 2
is a case in point. The point is also clearly made when Gallagher describes
the cognition involved in reaching a legal judgment:
These cognitive practices are such that in principle they could not happen just in the
head. Even in the case of a highly trained attorney who seemingly does her legal
reasoning in her head, what she does, and what makes it the kind of cognition that it
is, depends not only on the fact that she has previously engaged in the workings of the
legal system . . ., but on the ongoing workings of the legal system since what she
engages in, i.e., the particular cognitive process of forming a legal judgment, is what it
is only in that system. (Gallagher, 2013, p. 7; italics in the original)
Legal systems, educational systems, but also systems of cultural conventions
consist of tasks and roles that are inter-deﬁned and that jointly make up
these systems. As such, these systems are very much like Hutchins’ distrib-
uted cognitive systems. It may be remarked here that it would be a bit of
a stretch to call these systems cognitive systems, but then again, in more
recent work, Hutchins (2014) applies his distributed cognition approach to
what he calls “the cultural ecosystem of human cognition,” which consists
mainly of cultural practices and social institutions. Hence, we may put this
point aside.
Distributed cognition diﬀers from extended cognition in that it is not
a kind of cognition but, rather, a perspective on cognition and that it does
not take a centered perspective. However, the overlaps between the two
approaches are considerable. Hutchins conﬁrms this: “When the focus is on
systems that involve the interaction of persons with their immediate mate-
rial and social environment, the intersection of distributed cognition with
extended mind is substantial” (Hutchins, 2014, p. 37). Given this overlap, it
might seem like a good option to interpret Gallagher’s proposal as encom-
passing both extended and distributed elements – where the latter can be
used to ward oﬀ problems with cognitive bloat and the delineation of
cognitive systems.
However, there is one problem: Combining extended and distributed
cognition means adopting a distributed perspective on cognitive systems
that consists of human beings being coupled with external items, physical or
social. Viewing a system from a distributed perspective “implies that wher-
ever we ﬁnd cognition, it will be possible to investigate how a process we call
cognitive emerges from the interactions among elements in some system”
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(Hutchins, 2014, p. 36). Thus, from a distributed perspective on an extended
cognitive system, the question is what contributions a human being makes
to the larger system as a whole. Gallagher’s question (and the question with
which we began this paper) is the exact reverse: It is the question of what
social institutions contribute to our cognitive processes and abilities. This is
clear from later passages in Gallagher’s work, which follow those that
illustrate congeniality between socially extended and distributed cognition.
The passage on contracts continues as follows:
Contracts are institutions that embody conceptual schemas that, in turn, contribute to
and shape our cognitive processes. They are not only the product of certain cognitive
exercises, but are also used as tools to accomplish certain aims, to reinforce certain
behaviors, and to solve certain problems. (Gallagher, 2013, p. 6).
The passage on reaching a legal judgment is followed by this remark:
Socially established institutions sometimes constitute, sometimes facilitate, and some-
times impede, but in each case enable and shape our cognitive interactions with other
people. Such institutions allow us to engage in cognitive activities that we are unable
to do purely in the head, or even in many heads. (Gallagher, 2013, p. 7)
These two questions – “What does an individual contribute to the larger
social system she is a part of?” and “What does a larger social system
contribute to the cognition of an individual who is a part of that system?” –
are obviously connected. Their answers are codependent. And yet they are
diﬀerent questions which serve diﬀerent research interests. To ask how
social institutions change, enable, and constitute our cognitive abilities is
to take an “inside” perspective on distributed systems. It is to look at social
institutions from the perspective of individuals who are their constituents
and their users. This is the typical centered perspective that is also char-
acteristic of the extended cognition approach and which may have made the
extended cognition framework the natural choice for Gallagher. It is crucial,
however, that in order to determine how a legal system allows one to sign
a contract or how a system of conventions allows one to be polite in a given
situation, we need to look at how one’s behavior has become attuned in
speciﬁc ways to existing practices. Typically, this does not involve the whole
legal system or the entire system of conventions. One need not know all the
ins and outs of a legal system in order to sign contracts, and one can be
polite in one’s actions in one situation without being aware that similar
behavior in another situation counts as impolite. In other words, we usually
need not look at a social institution as a whole, in all its details, in order to
see how it constitutes one’s cognitive processes and abilities, but only at
those aspects that are pertinent to one’s role in and use of that institution.
The distributed cognition approach, by contrast, views the overall social
institution from a “zoomed-out,” external point of view in order to be able to
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determine how all the elements within it interact so as to constitute the larger
system. For such an approach, it would not do to focus merely on those
aspects that determine the behavior of one or a few of its constitutive
elements. However, in order to determine how the elements of a cognitive
system hang together from a distributed point of view, it is impossible and
usually not necessary to look at the speciﬁc ways in which each of these
elements operates and is connected to and determined by the components in
their direct vicinity. To use Hutchins’ examples, we can determine how visual
modules in the brain interact so as to enable depth-vision without looking at
the cellular or biochemical level of interaction between them, and we can
model the emergence of language in a group without modeling the speciﬁc
interactions between individuals.
Thus, approaching cognition in social institutions from a centered or from
a distributed perspective leads to diﬀerent questions that serve diﬀerent
research interests. This makes it hard to interpret Gallagher’s proposal as
a version of distributed cognition. However, now we have a predicament: The
intuitive problems that socially extended cognition is faced with (Section 3)
can be avoided by interpreting it as a form of distributed cognition (Section 4),
but that interpretation is incompatible with the centered nature of the ques-
tion that sets the agenda for Gallagher and for this paper.
6. Varieties of scaﬀolded cognition
The way out of this predicament is to see that there is an alternative for both
distributed and extended cognition that ﬁts the centered research interests
of Gallagher and explains how social institutions constitute cognitive pro-
cesses and abilities, but does so in a way that is more akin to distributed
cognition. To identify this option, we need to make a simple taxonomy of
diﬀerent ways in which cognition can be scaﬀolded4 by external items,
physical or social. The basis for this is a distinction between two dimensions
of the interaction between elements in a system from which cognition – or
a ‘cultural ecosystem of cognition’ such as a social institution – arises. I will
call these dimensions functional integration and task-dependency, but not
much depends on these labels. For the sake of brevity, the discussion of this
taxonomy will be sketchy, but this is enough for the overall argument of this
paper.
Functional integration is the extent to which the execution of tasks
involves coupling with items external to the brain and body. This coupling
might take many diﬀerent forms and can involve diﬀerent mechanisms.
Heersmink (2015) provides a detailed overview of the diﬀerent dimensions
involved in cognition-constitutive coupling between humans and artifacts
(he mentions information ﬂow, reliability, durability, trust, procedural
transparency, individualization, and transformation as dimensions of
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functional coupling). We might envisage a similar list for social coupling.
Lyre (2018), for instance, mentions all forms of social cognition as possible
candidates and gives a detailed account of joint intentionality as one such
mechanism. For our purposes, it is not necessary to taxonomize the
mechanisms behind and conditions for coupling, either with artifacts or
with humans; it is enough to stress that functional integration is a causal
notion. High functional integration means that items external to the brain
and body are so tightly and reliably coupled that they can be considered
constitutive elements of cognitive processing. Low functional integration
means that items that are external to the brain and body are less tightly
coupled and should hence be regarded as enabling or enhancing conditions
for these cognitive processes.5
Task-dependency is the extent to which the intelligibility of a task depends
on a larger whole of coordinated tasks. Task-dependency is a notion that is
connected with coordination and planning. It is a normative notion in the
sense that high task-dependency means that tasks play speciﬁc roles in the
overall organization of a cognitive system or a cultural cognitive ecosystem –
roles that can be played properly or improperly. A legal system, for example,
has a high degree of task-dependency: The tasks of judges, barristers, clerks,
prosecutors, and other oﬃcials are holistically inter-deﬁned such that we can
only explain what a barrister does, for instance, by referring to the roles of
judges and prosecutors. The same goes for a system of cultural conventions,
where various protocols inter-deﬁne the roles of participants, or for a system
of traﬃc regulations. While task-dependency is perhaps most easily recogniz-
able in social-cognitive systems, it can also be discerned at “lower” levels of
organization. In Hutchins’ example of the interplay of visual modules in the
brain, for instance, each module plays a certain role in the overall system that
realizes stereo vision, such that the role of each module is co-deﬁned by the
roles played by the other modules. The normativity, in this case, is not social
but derived from, for example, the “proper function” (Millikan, 1984) of these
modules, which is determined by the evolutionary heritage of the cognitive
system they are a part of.
Both functional integration and task-dependency come in degrees. For
our purposes, we can simply distinguish between high and low task-
dependency and high and low functional integration, ignoring the gray
areas in between for the sake of the argument. Likewise, I will merely appeal
to intuition, elicited by the standard examples of the debate, to distinguish
between high versus low functional integration or task-dependency. We can
use the two dimensions to make a matrix (see Figure 1) that provides us with
a simple taxonomy of four variations of scaﬀolded cognition, three of which
have the familiar labels of ‘embedded,’ ‘extended,’ and ‘distributed’ cogni-
tion. I will label the fourth symbiotic cognition.
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My main claim in the remainder of this paper is that social institutions
constitute cognitive processes and abilities through task-dependency, more
so than through functional integration. I will argue that characterizing
cognition that is constituted by social institutions as symbiotic rather than
distributed or extended cognition is more true to the nature of institutions
and avoids the predicament of the previous section. First, however, I will
brieﬂy elaborate on the four variations of scaﬀolded cognition, going clock-
wise starting from the top-left corner of the matrix.
Cognition that is aided, enabled, or enhanced but not constituted by
interaction with artifacts and other people is known as embedded cognition.
A typical example is following the signs to a gate at the airport. In such
a case, functional integration is arguably low – I am not continuously in
causal contact with signs, but I occasionally look for one when there is
a junction or when I lose my bearings. Likewise, there is no real task-
dependency. My activity – ﬁnding the right gate for my ﬂight – is intelligible
without the signs, even though their absence would make my task consider-
ably more diﬃcult. Embedded cognition does not play a big role in the
discussion that follows. Huebner (2013) argues that cognition that is scaf-
folded by social institutions is typically embedded cognition. I will argue
below that this is wrong.
Extended cognition is characterized by high functional integration. Clark
and Chalmer’s famous example of Otto, whose memory relies on
a notebook, is a case in point, and so is the example of the physicist
Feinman’s use of pen and paper for making complex calculations that
cannot be done in the head. In these cases, the causal coupling is frequent
(in Otto’s case) or virtually constant (in Feinman’s case), highly reliable, and
absolutely necessary to carry out the task. Because of this tight causal
coupling, extended cognition theorists argue that the pen and the notebook
are constitutive parts of the cognitive processes of remembering and calcu-
lating. And yet, however constitutive these items are for these processes, the
Figure 1. Varieties of scaﬀolded cognition.
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tasks of remembering or calculating are themselves intelligible in abstrac-
tion from tasks carried out by other people. To use the terminology of the
matrix, there is low task-dependency.
Like extended cognition, the standard examples of distributed cognition
are characterized by high functional integration. The team of sailors navi-
gating a marine vessel or the team of pilots collaborating in the cockpit of an
airliner are clear examples. The pilots and the sailors are coupled with
elaborate equipment, and Hutchins’ point is precisely that the high func-
tional integration of pilots or sailors with their instruments and machines is
what allows us to view these larger systems as cognitive systems in their own
right. Unlike extended cognition, though, distributed cognition is also
characterized by high task-dependency. The roles of each of the pilots in
the airliner and the roles of the sailors navigating the marine vessel are
holistically inter-deﬁned. That is, the tasks of each of these people are
unintelligible or seemingly pointless in abstraction from the tasks and
roles of others in the same system.6
The last square of the matrix stands for cognition that is characterized by
the same kind of high-task-dependency that is distinctive of distributed
cognition and the same kind of low functional integration that is character-
istic of embedded cognition. Cognition that is scaﬀolded by social institu-
tions ﬁts this proﬁle. As explained above, social institutions such as legal
systems, educational systems, and systems of cultural conventions typically
involve a very high degree of holistic inter-deﬁning of roles and tasks. The
tasks of judges, barristers, clerks, prosecutors, and so on are inter-deﬁned, as
are the roles of teacher, head of school, and pupil, and the roles of host,
guest, and waiter. This is completely in line with Gallagher and probably not
controversial.
What about low functional integration? This might seem less uncon-
troversial. Gallagher (2013, p. 6) writes that social institutions must be
“activated” to act as mental institutions by “enactive coupling.” Thus,
when writing about an individual who has to make a judgment about
the legitimacy of certain arrangements, for instance, he claims that this
individual “interacts with the legal system and forms a coupled system in
a way that allows new cognitive processes to emerge” (2013, p. 7). This
suggests that Gallagher sees high functional integration as a key feature of
cognition in social institutions. Still, this is too quick. What, exactly, does
the causal coupling of an individual with a legal system consist of? How
does one couple with a whole system? If we think of the person making the
judgment of legitimacy, it is certainly true that her thinking is constrained
and constituted by the legal system she is a part of. But if we think of how
the legal system does this, it would be plain wrong to say that she can
make this judgment only because she is causally connected to the system
in the right way at the moment of making the judgment. This would
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ignore the relevance of this person’s history with the system and ignore the
possibility that she makes the judgment while on vacation in a distant
country.
This conclusion may be premature, however. Why would there be a sharp
contrast between a person’s history with the system and casual coupling
with the system? After all, the person’s history with the system consists of
causal interactions between the person and the system. Can we not regard
that history as a form of distal causal coupling? I think not. Rather, I think
that the term ‘coupling’ is wrong. The causal interactions between a person
and a social institution which have made her a part of that institution, a user
of that institution, or both are not speciﬁc triggers for a person’s actions.
Rather, they are the structuring causes that have set the person up to become
sensitive and responsive to speciﬁc institution-related triggers (the distinc-
tion between triggering and structuring causes is taken from Drestke, 1988).
Such setting up is certainly a causal process, but it is the kind of process that
puts in place the way in which a person is coupled with a system, rather than
being part of that coupling.7
In fact, Gallagher’s references to causal coupling are sparse. Most of his
characterizations of cognition in social-institutional contexts are cast in
terms that can be translated into what I have labeled task-dependency:
that cognitive processes such as making a judgment about the legitimacy
of certain arrangements are intelligible only within the larger framework of
an institution within which other people have speciﬁc roles, tasks, and
responsibilities. This characterization of cognition in an institutional con-
text is then erroneously cast in terms of causal coupling (but only a few
times) because task-dependency and functional integration are mistakenly
conﬂated.
The extended cognition framework might seem like the right ﬁt for
cognition within social-institutions if we conﬂate task-dependency and
functional integration. However, this leads to the problems of Section 3,
and it seems wrong-headed anyway. The extent to which cognition within
legal systems, systems of conventions, and educational systems is character-
ized by functional integration – that is, by causal coupling with other people
and artifacts – is often considerably less than in the examples of distributed
cognition. For instance, I spend my time working in the educational system
of a university. That does involve functional integration – I need to interact
with colleagues, students, computers, libraries, and so on. However, I can
also function in that institution for days on end working at home, interact-
ing mostly with my laptop. This is quite diﬀerent from an airplane pilot or
marine vessel navigator who cannot perform their functions without being
in frequent contact with others and in almost continuous contact with
equipment.
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In order to defend and elaborate on the distinction between cognition in
groups with high functional integration and in those with low functional
integration, it is useful to have a label for the latter. Let us call cognition that
falls in the bottom-left square of the matrix symbiotic cognition. I am using
the term ‘symbiosis’ here as it is used in non-biological parlance. It is the
idea that the cognition of two or more people is codependent to their mutual
beneﬁt – one individual’s task would be pointless and senseless without
other people performing their respective tasks.8
I want to argue that symbiotic cognition, unlike distributed cognition,
invites a centered perspective on cognition. This is not obvious. The dis-
tinction between symbiotic cognition and distributed cognition is seemingly
gradual. Yet, the diﬀerence between a distributed perspective on a “group
mind” and a centered perspective on cognition in social institutions is
binary. The point is that there is a more principled distinction between
symbiotic and distributed systems that corresponds with low and high
functional integration. This distinction pertains to the purposes or aims of
distributed cognitive systems and symbiotic cognitive systems. The purpose
or aim of a distributed cognitive system is pitched at the supra-personal,
systemic level of description. That is, the purpose that is served by the
system should not be sought at the level of the individuals that co-
comprise the system, but at the more “zoomed out” level at which the
system as a whole can function as something like an agent or cognizer.
For example, the system comprised of pilots and cockpit equipment as
a whole has the purpose of controlling an airplane, more or less like
a mind controls a body. The purpose or aim of a “transactional memory
system” consisting of a married couple consists in storing and retrieving
memories together, more or less as is done by an individual. By contrast, if
we look at symbiotic cognitive systems, their purposes are pitched at the
sub-systemic, personal level. Educational systems educate individual per-
sons. Legal systems and cultural conventions allow individuals to coordinate
in various complex ways. The purpose that is served by symbiotic systems
should be sought at the level of the individuals that co-comprise them.9
From this point of view, it is natural to ask what supra-personal cognitive
systems do for people in the case of symbiotic systems and what people do
for supra-personal systems in the case of distributed systems. That is, it is
ﬁtting to adopt a centered perspective for cases of symbiotic cognition but
not for cases of distributed cognition. This does not mean that it is impos-
sible or useless to adopt a distributed perspective on symbiotic cognition or
a centered perspective on distributed cognition. Let me discuss both possi-
bilities in order to explain what it means to say that it is “ﬁtting” to adopt
a centered perspective on cognition in social institutions and a distributed
perspective on group mind systems.
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Adopting a distributed perspective on, say, an educational system is
perfectly possible. Doing so would require us to spell out a purpose of the
system at the supra-personal system level – for instance, in Durkheimian
functionalist terms. The point is that it would be contrived to call such
a function ‘cognitive’ because it does not resemble any paradigmatic cogni-
tive function. This is quite unlike the case of distributed cognitive systems:
Controlling an airplane is suﬃciently like controlling a body to count as
cognitive, and storing and remembering events together is suﬃciently like
storing and remembering events alone to count as cognitive. A distributed
perspective on a symbiotic system, by contrast, is not a perspective on
a cognitive system but a perspective on a system that shapes and enables
cognitive processes – processes which are discernible from a centered
perspective.
Conversely, it is perfectly possible to adopt a centered perspective on the
persons operating in a distributed cognitive system. However, here the
“problem” is exactly the opposite: We can only make sense of what
a single pilot is doing if we view his actions as a component of a larger
system that also includes elaborate equipment and a second pilot. There is
no natural sub-systemic, personal-level purpose we can ascribe to the
activities of a single pilot. Thus, the operations of a single pilot are better
described as part of a cognitive system.
Thus, unlike distributed cognition, symbiotic cognition invites a centered
perspective. This gives us an opening to dissolve the predicament of Section
5; here we have a perspective on cognition that is suﬃciently diﬀerent from
extended cognition and suﬃciently similar to distributed cognition to avoid
the problems of Section 3. Nothing in the idea that task-dependency con-
stitutes cognitive processes and abilities suggests that a social institution is
a part of our minds in the causal-coupling sense which leads to the problem
of cognitive bloat. Moreover, as long as the vagueness of the boundaries of
a system is no impediment for inter-deﬁning roles and tasks, this is not
a problem for our position either. Furthermore, this position is also suﬃ-
ciently diﬀerent from distributed cognition to allow for, and even invite,
a centered perspective on cognition. Thus, it seems that we have a potential
variety of scaﬀolded cognition that can solve Gallagher’s predicament; one
that has gone unnoticed because task-dependency and functional integra-
tion have not been properly distinguished.
Whether symbiotic cognition can indeed provide a solution to the
dilemma of Section 5 depends on whether it can function as a proper
alternative for the idea of socially extended cognition. In the next section,
I will explain that it can.
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 17
7. Symbiotic cognition
Gallagher’s characterization of cognition in social institutions as socially
extended cognition incorporates two important claims: (1) Social institutions
co-constitute cognitive processes and abilities, (2) cognition that is co-
constituted by social institutions allows for a substantial amount of cognitive
oﬄoading. This means that the notion of ‘symbiotic cognition’ can only be
a good replacement for ‘socially extended cognition’ if it incorporates similar
claims. In this last section, I claim that it does.
Symbiotic cognition provides a diﬀerent picture of how social institutions
constitute cognitive processes and abilities than does extended cognition. As
mentioned brieﬂy in Section 2, in the extended cognition framework “P is
a constitutive element [of X] if P is part of the processes that produce X” (De
Jaegher et al., 2010, p. 443). The idea here is that “the set of all the
constitutive elements is the phenomenon itself.” This can be unpackedin
diﬀerent ways. Constitution on an enactive view of cognition (Kirchhoﬀ,
2015) is diﬀerent from constitution on a functionalism-oriented, mechan-
istic view of cognition (Bechtel, 2008; Craver, 2007), but in each of these, the
constitutive elements of a cognitive process coincide temporally with the
occurrence of the cognitive process. This is a perfectly legitimate notion of
constitution that ﬁts well with the dimension of functional integration: the
elements that a person is causally coupled with constitute cognitive pro-
cesses during their execution.
The concept of ‘task-dependency’ provides a diﬀerent way of understand-
ing how social institutions are constitutive of cognitive processes and abilities.
If cognitive abilities and processes are inconceivable from a perspective out-
side of a symbiotic system such as a social institution, if they can only exist as
a result of the fact that an individual is part of such a system, then this is a form
of constitution too. The social institution creates and constitutes these abilities
and processes. Being polite at a reception, addressing an oﬃcial with her
appropriate title, knowing the diﬀerence between using coarse language in
a group of friends and to a stranger who oﬀended you, signing a contract,
fumbling for change to get a shopping cart at the supermarket, and so on –
these are activities that are impossible and inconceivable in abstraction from
their respective socio-cultural institutions. They have no analogues in a world
that is non-enculturated.
We can square this type of constitution with De Jeagher et al.’s character-
ization of constitution by allowing for a diﬀerent reading of ‘the process of
production.’ ‘The process of production’ need not only refer to the processes
that coincide with the execution of a given cognitive process. It can refer just
as well to practices of socialization and training that provide one with the
capacity to execute that cognitive process. One’s ability to use cultural
conventions and norms is acquired in the course of one’s upbringing.
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A judge’s capacity to rule in court cases is acquired with training in law
school, practice as a lawyer, and further training. Socialization, training,
education, and enculturation are processes in which individuals become
attuned to symbiotic cognitive systems such as social institutions. Through
such processes, social institutions constitute the symbiotic cognitive capa-
cities of individuals. Though this is not the type of constitution at play in
extended cognition, it is also not the type of scaﬀolding involved in
embedded cognition, precisely because, unlike in the case of embedded
cognition, social institutions constitute cognitive tasks by creating them.
Just like the type of constitution at play in symbiotic cognition is diﬀerent
from the type of constitution at play in extended cognition, there is
a diﬀerence between the type of cognitive oﬄoading involved in extended
cognition and that involved in symbiotic cognition. Daniel Dennett
describes cognitive oﬄoading as “enhancing, streamlining and/or protect-
ing our cognitive processes by means of various kinds of external devices”
(Dennett, 1996, pp. 134–135). This description suggests a comparison
between a cognitive process that is performed with and without external
devices, where the latter is supposed to proceed with less eﬀort, in an
enhanced way, or both. In other words, the cognitive process itself is
supposed to be intelligible in abstraction from its scaﬀolding. This is the
type of oﬄoading that is typically at play in extended cognition.
Gallagher gives the following example of cognitive oﬄoading, which
initially seems to follow this template. In this example, Judge Alexis has to
make a judgment in three diﬀerent situations:
(1) In the ﬁrst scenario she is asked to make her judgment on the basis of
her own subjective sense of fairness, weighing the evidence entirely in
her own head.
(2) In the second scenario experts specify the kind of questions or con-
siderations she can address.
(3) In the third scenario experts further provide possible answers and
a set of rules to follow in making her decision. (Gallagher, 2013, p. 6)
The obvious point here is that in the second scenario, Alexis can oﬄoad
some of the cognition she needs in Scenario 1, and in Scenario 3, she
oﬄoads some of the cognition she needs in Scenario 2. This seems like
typical extended-mind-style oﬄoading.
However, Gallagher continues to argue, importantly, that “it is clear that
cognition is socially extended across the legal institutional practices in all the
scenarios, since even in (1) Alexis is presented the evidence and given
a predetermined task. She does not think these up on her own”
(Gallagher, 2013, p. 6–7). Setting aside the terminological issues with the
label ‘socially extended,’ one important point here is that in all three
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scenarios, Alexis’ functioning is intelligible only in the context of the legal
system that determines and deﬁnes her task as judge, relative to the tasks of
others. What counts as evidence and how it should be weighed against other
considerations, what sentences she should choose from, the meaning of
notions like ‘fairness’ and ‘proportionality,’ and so on are intelligible only
from within the system.
Here something more than extended-mind-style oﬄoading seems to be at
play, for here an individual does not beneﬁt from external items (i.e., a social
institution) because they do some of the work that she used to do. Rather, an
individual beneﬁts from them because they allow her to be engaged in new
cognitive activities. In order to see how this amounts to oﬄoading, we need
to look at how an individual like Alexis beneﬁts from such newly acquired
cognitive abilities. For that, we need to look at the function of the symbiotic
system as a whole. The legal system as a whole, for example, serves the
society of which Alexis is a part. It does so by dividing and deﬁning labor
into smaller, carefully interconnected, complementary parts. One such part
is the role of a judge. Division of labor involves a speciﬁc type of oﬄoading,
one which is typical for symbiotic cognition but not for extended cognition.
Every participant in a symbiotic system proﬁts from whatever the system as
a whole oﬀers (e.g., education, justice, social coordination), while contribut-
ing only a small part. The tasks, jobs, and roles of others in the system co-
deﬁne and enable one’s own task, but one does not have to perform them or
even think about them, while nevertheless beneﬁtting from the overall
outcome of the system. This is cognitive oﬄoading too, as low-eﬀort input
produces high-gain output through scaﬀolding.
It is worth emphasizing that the low eﬀort versus high gain diﬀerence is
not only the result of the division of holistically inter-deﬁned labor. In many
symbiotic cognitive systems, the coordination of interconnected roles and
tasks is facilitated by a physical infrastructure and speciﬁc physical artifacts.
There would be no legal system without courtrooms, oﬃces for barristers,
physical law books and all kinds of paraphernalia, such as gowns, hammers,
and, in some countries, wigs. There would be no educational system without
school buildings, blackboards, pens and paper, computers, and so on.
Without these physical items, the speciﬁc interactions between people that
are characteristic of legal and educational systems cannot take place. While
many of these physical artifacts extend the minds of individuals, it would be
too much to say that the mind of an individual teacher, for example, is
extended by the whole infrastructure that is involved in an educational
system.
But it would not be incorrect to say that such an infrastructure extends
and co-constitutes a symbiotic system such as an educational system.
Thus, the notion of symbiotic cognition explains how social institutions
constitute cognitive abilities and processes and how they allow for cognitive
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oﬄoading. In this respect, symbiotic cognition shares the essential features of
socially extended cognition. However, both the constitution of cognition and
cognitive oﬄoading are of a diﬀerent character than constitution and oﬀ-
loading according to the extended cognition framework. This is exactly why
the symbiotic cognition framework can paint a more realistic picture than the
extended cognition framework – a picture that avoids the pitfalls of Section 3.
8. Summary and conclusion
In this paper I have argued for the following claims:
(1) The idea that cognition in the context of social institutions should be
characterized as socially extended cognition runs into problems of
cognitive bloat and delineation of cognitive systems.
(2) Adopting the perspective of distributed cognition does not help
because even though this perspective avoids these problems, it is
incompatible with the centered research question of characterizing
the cognitive processes and abilities of individuals in social
institutions.
(3) The ensuing predicament is the result of conﬂating two dimensions of
the interactions between elements of cognitive systems: functional
integration and task-dependency. Unlike extended and distributed
cognition, social institutions involve a type of cognition that is char-
acterized by low functional integration and high task-dependency,
which I have labeled ‘symbiotic cognition.’
(4) Like socially extended cognition, symbiotic cognition allows for
a centered perspective on cognition, it explains how social institu-
tions constitute cognitive abilities and processes, and it explains
how social institutions allow for cognitive oﬄoading. Like distrib-
uted cognition, though, symbiotic cognition does not fall prey to
the problems of cognitive bloat and delineation of cognitive
systems.
Notes
1. In the context of this paper, ‘socially extended cognition’ refers speciﬁcally to the idea
that cognition is constituted by social institutions. Other, usually more liberal, uses of
the terms exist in the literature.
2. This is not to say that complementing brain-based cognition automatically turns
external items into co-constituents of cognitive systems. For an extensive overview of
the further conditions that need to be met for this to be the case, see Heersmink
(2015).
3. This might be read as a lack or metaphysical commitment about the nature (brain-
bound or not) of cognition (Hutto, Kirchoﬀ, & Myin, 2014, p. 4). However, as Sutton
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emphasizes, “theorists of distributed cognition do (rightly) focus on encouraging
methodological and pragmatic change to scientiﬁc practice, and tend to see metaphy-
sical claims about the general nature of mind as having to arise from scientiﬁc work”
(Sutton, 2014, p. 429). Hutchins (1995, Chapter 9) is clear about the fact that cognitive
science should be re-designed to include collective cognitive systems.
4. I am using ‘scaﬀolding’ as a neutral, cover-all term that encompasses various ways in
which items external to the brain and body enable, enhance, and/or constitute
cognitive processing. See Sterelny (2010) for a similar use of the term.
5. A terminological note: ‘functional integration’ might evoke associations with func-
tionalism. Gallagher explicitly rejects a functionalist perspective on extended cogni-
tion. However, for one thing, the obvious alternative label ‘cognitive integration’ is
already taken. Menary’s (2007, 2010) notion of ‘cognitive integration’ diﬀers from the
notion of functional integration intended here, precisely because it takes a more
distributed and less centered perspective on cognition. Hence, Menary is not in
favor of the centered idea that social institutions constitute a person’s cognitive
processes. According to him, they are enabling background conditions.
Furthermore, I will claim in the next section that social institutions constitute cogni-
tion in a way that is not based primarily on functional integration. This would ﬁt
Gallagher’s proposal better because it solves the dilemma of Section 5. Hence, even if
functionalist associations remain, there is no harm done.
6. Hutchins emphasizes that distributed cognition is a perspective on cognition and not
a kind of cognition. Cognition that is characterized by high functional integration and
high task-dependency sounds like a kind of cognition. For now, I will bracket this
problem. Below, I will discuss how the diﬀerence between the lower two squares of the
matrix hinges mostly on perspective-taking.
7. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue. Thanks to Frank van Caspel
for suggesting the relevance of the distinction between structuring and triggering
causes.
8. In biology, this is known as mutualistic symbiosis, which is to be distinguished from
commensalistic or parasytic symbiosis. An example of mutualism is the relationship
between clownﬁsh and certain types of sea anemones. The territorial ﬁsh protects the
anemone from anemone-eating ﬁsh. The stinging tentacles of the anemone in turn
protect the clownﬁsh from predators, while a special mucus on their skin protects the
ﬁsh against the tentacles’ stings.
9. The connection between high functional integration and a system-level purpose is
intuitively plausible. High functional integration makes it easier to regard a system as
a single ‘agent’ or ‘cognizer.’ However, more conceptual research is required to
explain this connection, for the fact remains that the level of functional integration
seems to be a gradual notion. We cannot exclude the possibility of less functionally
integrated systems that have a system-level purpose (see, e.g., Perry, 2010), which
would warrant a ﬁfth category of cognition.
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